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Managerial risk-taking in international acquisitions in the brewery industry: 
Institutional and ownership influences compared 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper deals with the role institutional differences play in managerial risk-taking 
when engaging in international acquisitions. We assume that MNCs have different 
interests and capabilities when dealing with international acquisition, which in our 
view are significantly shaped by specific home country institutional influences. Our 
study concerns the question of how different forms of ownership – concentrated (e.g. 
family and bank based) and dispersed (stock market based) – influence risk-taking 
and managerial decision making in large international acquisitions. Comparing a total 
of 12 large acquisitions of four leading MNCs in the global brewery industry, the 
paper shows that mutually reinforcing influences of country of origin (coordinated vs. 
liberal market economies), and ownership (family ownership vs. stock market 
ownership) lead to different risk profiles and managerial risk-taking with regard to 
international acquisitions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) are an important and much researched aspect of 
corporate behaviour since they permit firms to utilize opportunities otherwise not 
available to them under normal operational parameters. Typically they can provide a 
series of benefits such as technological acquisition, market share increases, scale 
economies, access to distribution channels, vertical and horizontal integration and 
even diversification (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Trautwein, 1990). However, since many 
M&As do not succeed (Sirower, 1997) there has been a tendency to seek out specific 
aspects of such failure rather than see it as a result of more complex integration 
problems. By examining the initial context and drivers of change that provide the 
motivation behind such strategies, it is possible to evaluate outcomes and consider the 
role played by institutional features of the acquiring firm’s home country  in the 
shaping of such behaviour. This is especially important when considering 
international activities by firms.  
 
This paper examines the role institutional differences of coordinated versus liberal 
market economies, and simultaneously the effect of ownership patters, play in 
managerial risk-taking when engaging in international acquisitions. We assume that 
multinational corporations (MNCs) have different interests and capabilities when 
dealing with international acquisitions, which are, in our view, significantly shaped by 
specific home country institutional influences of the acquiring firm. Our study 
investigates how different forms of ownership influence risk-taking and managerial 
decisions about international acquisitions of four major players in the global brewing 
industry. 
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The brewing industry has undergone considerable consolidation over the past decade 
as firms have dealt with static domestic markets, intense rivalry in key overseas 
markets, and opportunities for expansion in emerging markets. In the 1990s the 
industry changed from being primarily domestic oriented or focusing on low 
commitment internationalization strategies such as export and licensing, to be very 
concentrated and truly global (Lopes, 2007). In the last decade international 
acquisitions have increased significantly across the industrial sector and to some 
degree they replace the strategy of forming joint ventures with local partners (ibid). 
However, given the larger commitment and the amount of resources involved, 
acquisitions are seen as both financially and politically more risky than other entry 
modes (see e.g. Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). The influence of the wider society 
on these strategic decisions, such as home country institutional differences and how 
they affect acquisition behaviour are often neglected or viewed in a deterministic way 
that eliminates managerial agency. Similarly, discussion of how risk is assessed is 
viewed as either an expression of changing strategic initiatives (new management or a 
reaction to dramatic changes in market activity) or the manifestation of a longstanding 
propensity that is culturally embedded. Both tend to oversimplify the interaction of 
key processes or the role of imitative behaviour that can occur. 
 
This paper argues that acquisition risk is conditional upon institutional features as 
well as firm ownership structure. By differentiating risk according to key firm 
characteristics we are able to show how overlapping and reinforcing institutional 
impacts make a clear difference in shaping risk-taking in large acquisitions. Our 
paper, therefore, focuses on an issue which has not been systematically explored so 
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far: the comparison of strategic decisions behind large international acquisitions and 
the role of managerial risk-taking. In order to understand and assess differences in 
managerial risk-taking, we refer to national specific institutional features of the 
acquiring company and compare how features of home country specific financial 
systems influence risk profiles and risk-taking within MNCs. We compare four MNCs 
that are in the same industrial sector, two originating from liberal market economies 
with large domestic markets for beer and two originating from coordinated market 
economies with a small home market. 
 
2. Analysing acquisition risk-taking: an eclectic review of the literature 
 
2.1 Acquisition risks 
Acquisitions are in general risky investments compared to other types of market entry 
such as export, licensing and strategic alliances, as they require a higher level of 
financial investment. Even compared to greenfield establishments, they incur greater 
risk due to the high premiums often paid for the target firm. High premiums put 
further risks on non-reversible investments, such as low divestment price of target 
firms (Brouthers and Dikova, 2010). Our first assessment criterion for acquisition risk 
is, therefore, the premium paid in relation to the share price of the target firm.  
 
The second criterion of acquisition risk is the relative size of the target firm, in terms 
of amount and quality of resources, in relation to the acquiring firm and the latter’s 
ability to capitalize on the target firm resources. From a resource-based point of view, 
Penrose’s (1959) growth theory predicts that current acquisitive growth is an outcome 
of previous organic and acquisitive growth. Companies are (or should be) constrained 
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by their amount and quality of resources, where past investments are likely to lead to 
path dependencies in future strategic action (Teece et al., 1997). Brouthers and 
Dikova (2010) express this situation as strategic flexibility, which is provided by past 
investment in human resources, information systems, financial structures, etc. 
Hoffmann and Schaper-Rinkel (2009) also find that external growth strategies require 
internal resources, particularly capital and management capacity. Lockett et al. (2011) 
emphasize that growth constraints are due to adjustment cost, which is the time and 
efforts used in integrating new managers and operations in expanding the activities of 
the firm. Further, Nooteboom (1999) emphasizes the need to be able to transfer 
resources to the ‘weak’ acquired firm in the form of managers, management systems, 
knowledge, capital and so forth, in order to replace or renew the consolidated 
practices of the target firm. The ability to reveal ex-ante synergy opportunities 
therefore relies on the amount and quality of the acquiring company’s 
resources.Acquisitions of relative large target firms are assessed to be risky when the 
acquiring company does not have the right amount and quality of resources in place.  
 
An aspect omitted from our analysis is the cultural distances between acquiring and 
acquired firms. Even though cultural mis-match has been associated with high failure 
rates of M&A (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999), cultural distance has also proven to 
enhance performance, as acquisitions provide access to valuable pools of critical 
embedded resources and practices otherwise not available to the acquiring firm 
(Morosoni et al., 1998). Cultural distance is, therefore, not an acquisition risk per se, 
but rather an obstacle to reveal ex ante synergies – an obstacle than can be solved by 
the integration strategy (Schweizer, 2005).  
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2.2 Influences of institutions: home country and ownership patterns 
 
Acquisition risks can also be assessed from an institutional point of view, although  
this has been done in a rather limited manner so far (Dunning, 2009). Mainly it is in 
reference to the structure and size of the domestic market and their influence on 
internationalization approaches of firms as well as the role of national industrial 
policies for the internationalisation of R&D activities (Narula, 2000). What has often 
been ignored is how different kinds of societal institutions govern business activities 
in ways that encourage firms to develop capabilities that enhance their 
competitiveness in new and different markets (Whitley, 2007). Similarly are there 
circumstances that inhibit foreign acquisition risk-taking? In an attempt to clarify and 
address this question we distinguish between coordinated and liberal market 
economies, and relate this to the division between family and concentrated ownership.  
 
2.2.1 Coordinated versus liberal market economies 
The role of home country national institutions has only briefly been considered in 
international management research as being critical to the analysis internationalization 
strategies (Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2003). The key question here is how 
differences between societal institutions (e.g. the political, financial, educational and 
industrial relations systems) influence acquisition strategies of MNCs. It is assumed 
that national specific institutional characteristics are reflected in strategic managerial 
decision processes of the MNC because of these actors’ socialisation and social 
embeddedness within their home country society and culture. Implicit here is an 
understanding of culture whereby shared beliefs and attitudes about what is 
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appropriate to do in particular circumstances is paramount (Hall and Soskice 2001, 
Whitley 1999).  
 
Using a comparative institutionalist perspective we distinguish between two 
significantly different systems: bank-based financial systems that are typical for 
coordinated market economies such as Denmark and the Netherlands and market-
based financial systems that are typical for liberal market economies such as the UK 
and the USA (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Both types of market economies match 
very well with underlying cultural differences such as collectivism/individualism 
(Hofstede 1980i) In contrast to liberal market economies, capital markets in 
coordinated market economies are less developed, and concentrated forms of 
ownership are institutionally supported. In coordinated economies banks use 
ownership stakes to pursue the strategic interests of their clients (firms), compared to 
shareholders who mainly follow financial interests in order to increase the market 
value of shares (ibid). The strategic approach of stock market listed firms is often 
more narrowly focused on financial control of assets; the approach of the latter, 
however, is much more broadly focused on the company’s long-term growth (ibid). 
In sum, financial systems in coordinated market economies are characterised as more 
deeply socially embedded in the national business system with so-called relationship 
banking a common practice (Whitley, 1999). This is opposite to companies that have 
arm lengths relations with banks in liberal market economies, such as the UK or the 
US. Relationship banking means that banks are strongly involved in lending, 
supporting long-term commitment which involves having ‘softer’ measures in place 
for firms that under-perform or have short-term financial problems (see also Geppert 
and Martens, 2009).  
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These home country specific institutional differences are mirrored in the beer industry 
as seen in Table I. One can see that the British brewery Scottish and Newcastle (S&N) 
increased its stock market based investments to finance its acquisitions investments 
abroad. Furthermore, Anheuser Bush (A-B) of the US has the highest degree of stock 
market reliance. In comparison, the influence of bank based corporate financing of the 
two MNCs from coordinated market economies (Heineken, the Netherlands, and 
Carlsberg, Denmark) is significantly higher. 
 
Table I about here 
 
2.2.2 Family versus stock market based ownership forms 
Intitutionalist approaches often suffer from the problem of ‘oversocialized’ agency, 
leaving no room for strategic choice and managerial decision making (Child, 1972). 
Dealing with this problem, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) propose an ‘actor-centred’ 
institutionalist framework that captures the interconnectedness of managerial 
strategies and societal constraints. Accordingly, it is assumed that societal institutions 
of liberal market economies encourage ‘autonomy’ ‘to make tough decisions’ or to 
impose hierarchical control in the firm’ (ibid, p. 457). Managers in coordinated 
market economies, however, are seen as more ‘committed’ because they are 
dependent on ‘firm specific relationships’ to owners (ibid, p. 458), which includes 
banks and families as well as other important stakeholders such as employees and 
trade unions. These institutional pressures, therefore, affect ownership patterns in the 
coordinated and liberal market economies. Family ownership is often treated as a 
“form of European exceptionalism or a political and institutional reluctance to follow 
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the U.S. path of modern capitalism” (James, 2008, p. 1), despite the fact that family 
firms are far more common around the world, including in the UK and US and 
especially in certain sectors, as the brewery industry.  
 
There has been an extensive debate as to whether family owned or stock market listed 
firms are more efficient and better business models. Some argue that the dominance 
of the family leads to agency problems, such as poor management and inefficient 
internationalization approaches (Fernández and Nieto, 2006); others challenge agency 
theory by showing that  managers of family firms seem to be better equipped than 
managers of stock market listed firms to develop  sustainable and entrepreneurial 
management concepts (Zahra, 2003). Our research concurs with Lopes’ (2007) study  
on the alcoholic beverage industry (spirits, wine and beer) which is consistent with the 
latter argument stressing that family firms are adept at balancing entrepreneurship 
with professional management and thus better equipped to take advantage of strategic 
opportunities than their stock market listed counterparts.  
 
2.3 Research Assumptions 
Capturing this interconnectedness between home country institutional influences, 
ownership patterns and managerial risk-taking, our paper assumes the following: 
 
(1) MNCs originating in coordinated market economies tend to have lower risk 
profiles and apply a more cautious managerial risk-taking approach when it 
comes to large international acquisitions and post-acquisition strategies. In 
comparison, managerial risk-taking is higher in MNCs originating in liberal 
market economies because there is stronger pressure for short-term profits (as 
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indicated by quarterly financial reports) since depressed earnings can lower share 
prices. Conversely, family owned companies are far less likely to be subject to 
this pressure as long as owners view short term negative performance as a trade 
off for longer term financial viability. 
(2) Concentrated ownership forms, based on closer social relationships between 
controlling shareholders, such as banks and families, institutionally support the 
development of a more moderate risk profile. We believe that concentrated 
ownership reinforces this tendency, leading to more cautious managerial risk-
taking in the case of international acquisitions.  
(3) Risk profile and managerial risk-taking are high when MNCs pay higher 
premiums for international acquisitions  and when the acquiring firm’s pool of 
resources is likely to constrain an effective integration process and limit the 
capitalization of ex-ante synergies.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
Utilising a case study approach, this paper analyses managerial risk-taking in the 
international acquisition strategies of global breweries.  A comparative setting was 
chosen to increase variance and divergence in data aiming at a better understanding of 
the specific mechanisms of managerial risk-taking in firms originating from 
systematically different institutional contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989; George and Bennett, 
2005). Based on the national business systems approach (Whitley, 1999) two firms 
from coordinated market economies (Heineken and Carlsberg) and two firms 
originating from liberal market economies (Anheuser-Busch (A-B) and Scottish & 
Newcastle (S&N)) were selected. 
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For each of these companies, three large foreign acquisitions that took place between 
the early 1990s and 2006 were selected (see table II). Moreover, in each case, the 
three acquisitions considered represent a large part of the increase in multinationality 
that these companies have undergone between 1990 and 2006ii. The final selection on 
what large acquisitions to study was determined by data availability. The year 1990 
has been chosen as starting point for our research as the early 1990s are seen as a 
phase in which the acquisitions of brewery companies started to intensify (Benson-
Armer et al., 1999; Lopes, 2007). The year 2006 was taken as an end to allow an 
assessment of post-acquisition integration. 
 
Data on acquisitions was compiled from multiple secondary sources. One source was 
the 2008 Thomson Financial Extel Company reports, listing the largest acquisitions a 
company has undertaken from 1990 till 2006 with information on deal date, deal 
value, shares bought and shares held. This information was cross checked and 
substantiated by information given on large acquisitions in the ‘History section’ of the 
corresponding 2008 company profiles of Datamonitor. Inconsistencies between the 
two sources were clarified by information provided in business newspapers and 
magazines. Business and newspaper magazine articles also served as an independent 
data source providing information on the risk associated with individual acquisitions 
as well as on the post-acquisition integration process. They were systematically 
accessed by Lexis-Nexis press retrieval services as well as by visits in the HWWA 
press archive.iii In addition to numerous newspaper and magazine articles covering 
strategic and organizational issues on the four firms studied, selected information 
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from the companies (mostly annual reports) as well as from secondary sources (e,g. 
Elshof, 2004; Ebneth and Theuvsen, 2007; Dieng et al., 2009) was included. 
 
A focus on published secondary data was pursued to avoid strategically manipulative 
answers that might have been obtained for instance by interviewing company officials 
on critical issues such as acquisition risks or expected synergies (cf. Salancik and 
Meindel, 1984). Typical problems that occur when using published secondary sources 
were carefully dealt with: in this instance following Scott’s (1990) approach by 
critically assessing the authenticity, credibility, representativeness and the meaning of 
each document used. Based on this evaluation, 12 draft cases on individual 
acquisitions were developed by the authors. Using the concept of investigators 
triangulation (Houman-Anderson and Skaates, 2004) each co-author was searching 
for within-case and across-case patterns, with the individual results being discussed 
and consolidated in two meetings. Finally, the result of our analysis was validated in  
interviews with company representatives and industry experts. 
 
4. Cross-case and -country comparisons 
 
As posited above we expect that the mutually reinforcing influences of country of 
origin (coordinated vs. liberal market economies) and ownership (family ownership 
vs. stock market ownership) lead to different risk profiles and managerial risk-taking 
with regard to international acquisitions. Thus, we assume Heineken and Carlsberg, as 
two family owned breweries from coordinated market economies that have been 
pioneers in internationalizing, to operate with a much lower risk profile than A-B and 
S&N, two stock-market listed companies from large liberal market economies that 
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have tried to catch up in internationalization through acquisitions. We also expect that 
higher risk profiles are linked with resource constraints, which consequently leads to 
increased managerial risk-taking in related company cases.  
 
Our analysis focuses on different aspects of acquisition risk-taking, which is: 1) the 
premium paid for the target firm, 2) ownership influences, and 3) the resource related 
growth constraints of the firms. 
 
4.1 Target firm premium 
The premium paid for the target firm is related to the investment risk of the 
acquisition. The higher the premium being paid, the higher the synergy effects 
required to make the investment profitable. As a research assumption, we expect that 
Heineken and Carlsberg would have paid lower premiums than A-B and S&N.  
 
Table II about here 
 
Looking at the financial data given in table II, which provides a brief overview on the 
acquisition cases included in our study, the assumption above is supported. On a 
comparative basis, A-B and S&N paid significantly more for their large acquisitions 
than Heineken and Carlsberg. Heineken paid on average 1.99 times the multiple of 
sales (based on data for 3 large acquisitions) whereas Carlsberg only paid 1.30 times 
the multiple of sales (based on data for 2 large acquisitions). This compares to an 
average of 2.64 times the sales paid in large deals by S&N and 2.60 by A-B (based on 
data of each 3 large acquisitions). A similar but somewhat less striking difference 
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between the two groups of companies can be found by looking at the relationship 
between the deal value and the EBITA (or net profit).  
 
In the case of Heineken, market analysis suggests that the price paid for Austrian 
BBAG was slightly too high. Despite this, analysts unanimously agreed that the 
company’s strategic positioning and cost savings were optimum (Financial Times 
Deutschland, May 5, 2003). Furthermore, compared to the cost of a typical greenfield 
establishment in Russia, the price paid by Heineken for Bravo was considered as fair 
by market analysts (Eliassov, 2002). Regarding Carlsberg’s acquisitions, market 
analysts only reacted on the take-over of German Holsten, assessing it as less 
promising (Børsen, January 1, 2004; Børsen, February 11, 2004). 
 
However most of the financial press were shocked when A-B announced a hostile 
takeover bid for Chinese Harbin in 2004. A-B entered a bidding war with SABMiller 
because it wanted to counter the latter’s expansion into China’s fast growing beer 
market (Financial Times, May 17, 2004). The winning bid of $720m was viewed by 
many as about $200m more than the company was worth with the Economist going so 
far as calling the bid “irrational”(Economist, June 4, 2004). The bid represented five 
times Harbin’s 2003 sales and about 35 times the EBITA. 
  
The acquisitions made by S&N were an outcome of its divestment strategy. In 
response to the constant pressure from analysts and shareholders, S&N management 
first divested its leisure business (2000) and subsequently sold its restaurant and pub 
business (2003). Then, S&N sold its stake in the holiday centre’s business (Center 
Parcs) at about 30% below initial price expectations (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
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March 1, 2000; Börsen Zeitung, November 22, 2000). Nevertheless, the financial 
leeway gained through these divestures was needediv to acquire three large brewery 
groups abroad in a very short period of time leading to increased premiums paid. The 
premium paid for French Kronenbourg was comparatively low in relation to the other 
cases; however the scope for synergies was seen as rather limited, as the Kronenbourg 
brand is hardly known outside France. Hence, analysts claimed the price as being too 
high (Financial Times, March 21, 2000). Furthermore, one month later, S&N acquired 
a 49% minority stake in Portuguese Central de Cervejas. In 2003 the remaining 51% 
was acquired. The total deal was worth 828 m€ – 3.3 times the annual sales volume. 
As some analysts noted, this rather high price is only partly justified by the potential 
of the well known Sagres brand (Financial Times, May 14, 2003). 
 
4.2 Ownership influences 
Next we compare differences in risk profile and managerial risk-taking in relation to 
the differences in ownership structures. We again expect a lower risk profile in the 
case of family or foundation influence compared to MNCs with dispersed (stock 
market listed) ownership.  
 
Heineken’s cautious acquisition strategy is underpinned by its ownership structure, 
which gives the Heineken family a 50.005 per cent voting edge. The family in general 
dislikes large acquisitions that might have negative repercussions on the corporate 
culture. Family control is considered as “a safeguard to continuity, independence and 
stability” as well as essential to the “controlled steady growth of the activities of the 
Heineken group” (Heineken annual report, 2009, p. 160). One example of a cautious 
acquisition strategy was when Heineken did not engage in the take-over battle for 
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SAB at the end of the 1990s due to the political risks involved. Also financial risks 
hamper investments abroad. Another example is the wait and see approach Heineken 
took with regard to the Chinese market, reflecting the overall policy of Heineken to 
“…not so much look at the volume but at profit” (CEO Jean van Boxmeer in Börsen 
Zeitung, June 22, 2002) According to Boxmeer “acquisitions are not done at any 
price” (ibid), but need to quickly contribute to profit and shareholder value.  
 
In the inaugural statement of the Carlsberg foundation, Carlsberg’s founder J.C. 
Jacobsen claimed that the Carlsberg Foundation “forever must own a minimum of 
51% of shares of Carlsberg A/S” (Berlingske Tidende, November 4, 2000). Further, 
composition of Carlsberg’s management board was specific, with an extraordinarily 
large number of representatives from science and academia (Glamann, 1997). This 
fact is  reflected in the risk profile where up until the second half of the 1990s, 
Carlsberg had a majority ownership in only eight of the 27 breweries (Iversen and 
Arnold, 2008). Moreover, it turned out that it was impossible for Carlsberg 
management to acquire Kronenbourg in 2000, as its owner, Danone, wanted a part-
payment in shares which was blocked by the Carlsberg Foundation (ibid.). However, 
in the late 1990s, stock market analysts started to criticize Carlsberg’s rather cautious 
internationalization strategy and attacked the management board as a board of “aunts” 
(Jyllands Posten, June 1, 2000). These incidents finally triggered an attitude change at 
the Carlsberg Foundation. In 2000, the Foundation relinquished its requirement to 
hold a minimum of 51% of Carlsberg A/S and the number of representatives from 
academia in the management board was reduced to one member (ibid.). These 
changes clearly led to some larger and more risky international investments, such as 
the 2008 mega-acquisition of S&N. However, Carlsberg continues to display strong 
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risk awareness, reflected in a cautious partial acquisition strategy and a strong drive 
for efficiency in sourcing, production and distribution by newly acquired subsidiaries 
abroad. Another example is the fact that in 2002 Carlsberg did not buy Hartwall’s 
share in BBH, of which Carlsberg already owned 50%. According to an anonymous 
source in Carlsberg this was due to concerns of the Carlsberg Foundation, which 
considered entry into the Russian market too risky at this time (Børsen, February 20, 
2004). 
 
According to many experts, the rather late and contradictory acquisition strategy of A-
B is also a testament to struggles for control within the firm, where members of the 
founding family have historically wielded more power than their shareholdings 
(approximately 4% of voting stock) would suggest, and the short-term interests of the 
capital markets were satisfied for a rather long time from the earnings on the domestic 
market. The board was conservative over initial overseas expansion, preferring joint 
ventures. Yet when A-B’s major competitors aggressively expanded into emerging 
markets, the company followed suit, but without an operational coherence other than 
that of building market share. Such actions were less motivated by shareholder value 
concerns than they were by an almost visceral response by the family dominated 
management structure in the St Louis headquarters. In this sense the company’s 
actions were an immediate response to the behaviour of its competitors; a short term 
view that would have long term financial repercussions. For many in the business 
press the managerial actions were deemed irrational and fiscally imprudent, but also 
seen as reflecting the failure of August Busch III to invest significantly overseas when 
earlier opportunities arose (Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2008).  
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In comparison to the other three cases, the acquisition strategy of S&N was the most 
open towards the short term profit expectations of analysts and shareholders. This 
became quite obvious in the firm’s behaviour prior to the take-over. Even when the 
management actively opposed the hostile take-over bid of rivals Heineken and 
Carlsberg and tried to force Carlsberg legally to sell its stake in BBH to S&N, the 
CEO, a former City analyst, made it quite clear that - no matter whether S&N or its 
rivals will win these ‘battles’- “either way our shareholders will benefit” (Financial 
Times, November 21, 2007). This meant that shareholders and analysts moved 
increasingly into prominent positions, playing with options to sell S&N to a number 
of highly interested competitors. This is reflected in S&N’s management board that 
has consistently been filled with non-executive directors which no longer saw room 
for S&N as an independent global brewer (see e.g. Financial Times, October 18, 
2007), leaving the integration of the 3 large acquisitions S&N had undertaken after 
the millennium unresolved (see in more detail below). S&N was indeed one of the 
few remaining brewers with an open share register and no controlling shareholder in a 
consolidating sector (The Grocer, October 20, 2007).  
 
4.3 Resource related risks  
A third aspect of risk-taking in acquisitions is resource related risk that might lead to 
growth constraints. As discussed earlier, two intertwined factors can make up such 
growth constraints. The first factor is the amount and quality of resources in the target 
firm, especially when subsequent substantial investments are needed to increase 
efficiency and reveal synergy. The second deals with the resources and the experience 
available at the acquiring firm to deal with such resource mismatch. We will first 
analyse the cases of Heineken and Carlsberg and show that they took fewer resource 
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related risks and that they could draw on strong historical experience in dealing with 
such risks. This is followed by an analysis of A&B and S&N, where strong resource 
related acquisition risks were aggravated by missing resources, political will and 
experience in dealing with such risks. 
 
All three acquisition targets of Heineken met criteria for efficiently run breweries. 
With the take-over of Spanish Cruzcampo, Heineken became market leader in Spain 
with significant future growth potential (The Guardian, June 11, 1999; Heineken 
annual report, 2007). Moreover, Heineken gained access to the highly valuable market 
knowledge of BBAG in Central and Eastern Europe: “BBAG are good brewers, and 
they know the region like nobody else” (CEO of Heineken Tony Ruys cited in 
Business week online, September 8, 2003). Further, BBAG was considered to be a 
company with an extremely solid balance sheet and decent management (Financial 
Times May 3, 2005). Taking over Russian Bravo provided Heineken with a well 
managed state-of-the-art brewery. Moreover, Bravo had successfully launched a 
premium brand named Bochkarev (The St. Petersburg Times, February 2, 2002).  
 
Heineken was also an experienced acquirer. It has a long tradition of international full 
and partial acquisitions and had already reached a high level of internationalization by 
the 1990s (Dieng et al., 2009). Heineken’s experience is demonstrated by the far 
reaching integration of Cruzcampo, which successfully made its global brands 
‘Heineken’ and ‘Amstel’ into market leaders in Spain. Moreover, a new very efficient 
brewery was built in Seville, the first greenfield investment of Heineken in Western 
Europe in 25 years. The acquisition of BBAG also fit perfectly into the Heineken 
network of subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe (Elshof, 2005). This was 
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accompanied by a careful integration policy that initially focused on preserving 
BBAG activities. None of the Austrian production sites was closed immediately, and 
closures in Central and Eastern Europe affected both former BBAG and Heineken 
plants. For example, in Hungary, Heineken’s site was closed, whereas Brau Union’s 
two breweries maintained production. Heineken integrated its Central and Eastern 
European businesses (including Germany, Greece and Russia) into BBAG/Brau 
Union’s existing organizational structure and declared the head-office of Brau Union 
as the divisional Headquarters of all Heineken activities in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Finally, in the case of Russian brewery Bravo, Heineken decided to keep the 
Russian management and continuously undertook follow-up investments. (Heineken 
Annual Report, 2007). 
 
Despite initial problems, the acquisitions made by Carlsberg  were ultimately 
successful, realizing both synergies and growth. Initially, the investment in Okocim in 
Poland turned out to be problematic, and Carlsberg experienced a drop in market 
share from 8% to 5%. Furthermore, production and distribution at Okocim was rather 
inefficient and Carlsberg had to spend 70m€ to upgrade the company. (Carlsberg 
Annual Report, 2006). Declining sales in Switzerland following the acquisition of 
Feldschlösschen was an outcome of declining sales in the market in general. Holsten, 
at the time of take-over ranked second in the Northern Germany, and yet was an 
international player with sales in 90 countries. 
 
Similar to Heineken, Carlsberg has quite a long history of internationalization. They 
have marketed beer abroad since the 19th century and foreign investments intensified 
in the 1950s and 1960s. This included greenfield investments in a number of countries 
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around the world over the next two decades as well as taking over stakes in small and 
medium sized foreign breweries (Glamann, 1997). Based on these experiences 
Carlsberg was able to integrate the three larger acquisitions studied here. Okocim was 
upgraded through large investments in capacity and modernization of production 
assets (Carlsberg Annual Report, 2006). Furthermore, the number of production sites 
had been reduced from four to three, packaging sites from 12 to seven, and 
warehouses from 12 to six (Koudal and Engel, 2007). The rather successful 
integration of Okocim is also demonstrated by the fact that it has gained an 
international mandate despite initial plans of Carlsberg to replace the local brand with 
Carlsberg’s international brands (Meyer and Tran, 2006). Thus the Okocim brand has 
been launched in the UK (targeting the 600,000 Polish inhabitants in Britain (Grocer, 
March 11, 2006; Marketing Week, June 28, 2007) and India (Business Today, 
October, 21, 2007). In respect to Feldschlösschen strong restructuring efforts (e.g., 
significant investments in production) were made, the number of breweries was 
reduced, and wine and mineral water businesses were divested. Feldschlösschen soon 
met the profit standards of successful Carlsberg breweries elsewhere (Jyllands Posten, 
August 4, 2004). Finally, synergies were soon gained in the case of Holsten through 
the transfer of Carlsberg best practices in production processes and procurement, 
combined with the cross selling of Carlsberg and Holsten brands. Further, due to 
strong reorganisation efforts, such as spinning off the brewery in Mönchengladbach 
and starting to produce Holsten in the UK, cost efficiency has been reached over time 
(Børsen, January 23, 2004; Carlsberg Press release, November 10, 2005). 
 
Unlike Heineken and Carlsberg, A-B in the past relentlessly pursued a strategy 
designed to increase its domestic market share, entering into joint ventures and 
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strategic alliances with overseas companies more as a secondary activity. An 
obsession with domestic market share was perhaps borne out of the sheer size of the 
US market and the fact that A-B had built up significant brand equity over the past 
100 years. However, as price competition intensified and industry concentration in the 
US increased during the 1980s and early 1990s, A-B was forced to rethink its earlier 
complacency towards internationalisation. First notable internationalizations however 
were taken about 100 years later compared to the internationalization of Heineken and 
Carlsberg. One example of A-B’s late internationalization steps is a joint venture 
between A-B and Japan’s Kirin Brewery, formed in 1993 to control marketing, sales 
and distribution. In a similar vein, a licensing arrangement with Oriental Brewing 
Company Ltd in Korea allowed A-B premium Brand ‘Budweiser’ to establish a share 
in excess of 70 percent of the international beer brands in that country (Anheuser 
Bush Annual Report, 1993). Later, A-B embarked upon a different international 
strategy when it acquired a stake in Mexico’s leading brewer Grupo Modelo in 1993 
and China’s largest brewing company, Tsingtao, in that same year. In 2004 it added to 
this activity by mounting a hostile bid for Harbin, China’s fourth largest brewery. 
These three acquisitions appeared to many in the financial press to be more of a 
reaction to other major foreign brewers’ international strategies than  a carefully 
thought out plan by A-B. While Grupo Modelo made sense given the growth in 
consumption of its core beers (Corona and Corona Light) in the US and the existing 
marketing relationship between the two companies, the latter two acquisitions were 
expensive and contradictory (Harbin and Tsingtao were major competitors with each 
other) and made in a hyper competitive, cost driven market (Heracleous, 2001). 
Additionally, it wasn’t clear what plans A-B had for the combined company, how the 
newly acquired assets would fit with its existing relationship with Tsingtao (Financial 
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Times, June 29, 2005), and how such risky foreign acquisitions would be integrated 
and thus create synergies with A-B’s core business in the large US home market. 
Overall, a misfit with regard to the quality of resources in the target companies was 
accompanied by a lack of strategic foresight and experience in international post-
acquisition integration. 
 
Originating from a large and protected beer market, it was not before the turn of the 
millennium that S&N seriously entered foreign markets (e.g. Lewis 2001). Initially 
only exporting beer to a limited number of countries, S&N’s internationalization 
skyrocketed following a few large acquisitions in the early 2000s. With the 
acquisition of Kronenbourg, S&N suddenly became the market leader in France. 
Likewise, the take-over of Hartwall, the joint venture with BBH, gave S&N access to 
30% of the Russian market. These acquisitions not only displayed on average a higher 
financial risk than the financial risks taken by Heineken and Carlsberg (see above), 
but their integration and the creation of synergies turned out to be a problematic 
management task, exacerbated by the time pressures triggered by short term financial 
pressures. S&N management struggled, ultimately unsuccessfully, to absorb these 
acquisitions. For example, the restructuring and integration of Kronenbourg up until 
2003 was rather limited, but intensified in the years that followed (e.g. though plant 
closures, transfer of production, cost saving programs, and IT integration) (Financial 
Times, July 2, 2003; Financial Times August 10, 2005). Further, integration of 
Central de Cervejas into S&N was rather limited due to an unfolding debate in 
Portugal on the sale of the country’s biggest companies to foreigners. Thus, Central de 
Cervejas continued to be managed by an independent management team in which 
Portuguese executives dominated (Financial Times, May 14, 2003). Finally, 
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integration of Hartwall remained rather piecemeal, with Carlsberg, a fierce 
competitor, owning the other half of BBH. Hence, BBH continued to be managed 
from Helsinki. In short, like in the case of A-B, S&N had little experience in 
international acquisitions leading to weak post-acquisition strategies and difficulties in 
creating viable synergies between its core business in the home country and the 
acquired companies abroad.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
Table III provides an overview of our key findings. Our initial research assumption 
that Heineken and Carlsberg display lower risk profiles in large acquisitions abroad 
than A-B and S&N is broadly confirmed. We also found some support for the 
underlying relationship assumptions. The companies from small home countries 
(Heineken and Carlsberg) internationalized from the outset. Since further growth 
often was only possible abroad, these firms developed a rather strong position outside 
their home country over decades. In both cases, the owning family (Heineken) or 
Foundation (Carlsberg) directly vetoed acquisitions that seemed too risky and made 
certain that management followed a rather long-term approach, engaging in large 
take-overs only when they were financially and strategically sound. This due 
diligence also shows  up in their better strategic capability to create synergies between 
the acquired target firms and other business units of the companies, which was 
missing in cases of A-B and S&N. Finally, Heineken and Carlsberg display a much 
lower reliance on capital markets in their financing than A-B and S&N (see Table I), 
thus sheltering managerial risk-taking from short term profit maximizing pressure 
from capital markets.  
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This pressure was most evident in the case of S&N, where management was pushed 
into a rather high risk strategy with regard to large acquisitions. We found reinforcing 
influences of the short-termist capital market (home country influence) leading to high 
‘speed’ (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002) and thus risky large acquisitions which made 
it difficult for the management to learn and develop the company into a sustainable 
and independent global player within the beer industry. Our research also confirms the 
findings of an earlier comparative study on managerial decision-making styles 
(Axelsson et al., 1991) which stresses that strategic decisions in British firms are 
made quicker because participants show relatively low commitment, in comparison to 
their Swedish counterparts. Managerial decision-making in coordinated market 
environments requires more negotiation, which leads to both longer decision times 
and stronger managerial commitment. 
 
A-B is the company, with the highest percentage (98.6%) of shares listed on the stock 
market of our four cases (see Table I). However, the firm’s dominant position in the 
domestic market and its foray into internationalization largely structured around joint 
ventures left it somewhat unwilling to recognise the benefits of international 
acquisitions and then exposed its lack of experience when it finally did commit to 
such a strategy. Not surprisingly the ‘irregularity’ of this strategic approach is 
negatively related to performance, as Vermeulen and Barkema (2002) have argued. 
However, the effects of the capital market on international acquisition strategies and 
risk-taking are less clear cut in comparison to S&N. This indicates the moderating 
role of both the size of the home country market, which makes A-B a late comer in 
terms of acquiring wholly owned subsidiaries internationally, and that of the founding 
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family. A-B’s earlier behaviour, where executives were responsive to dominant family 
members, suggests what Roberts (2004) termed an affliction with hubris and an 
overestimation of their abilities to run the company. The recent rise of investor 
activism finally put paid to that modus operandi, with the debacles associated with A-
B’s poorly conceived China strategy exposing the management ineptitude. Unlike 
family or foundation dominated firms in coordinated economies, A-B’s family grip on 
the company was no match for shareholders seeking to maximise their short term 
profits when an opportunity arose.  
 
Analyzing the particular risk profiles of the companies, Heineken and Carlsberg show 
a strong concern for the financial exposure they incur with large acquisitions, 
carefully select targets aimed at a strategic fit and devote many managerial efforts to 
the rationalization, modernization and integration of the acquired firms. In 
comparison, A-B and S&N played catch-up in internationalization. The result is that 
they incurred rather high financial risks, missed an optimal strategic fit and 
overstrained their organizations with a large burden of integration tasks, for which 
they lacked both experience and capacity. 
 
To sum up, with an increase in the pace of consolidation in the global beer market 
after the turn of the millennium, including more and more large and very large 
acquisitions, companies with a strong history of internationalization and a strong 
influence of family or foundation ownership seem to survive and prosper (Carlsberg 
and Heineken). In contrast, companies with comparatively little international 
experience and a rather dispersed ownership (A-B, S&N) made less fiscally prudent 
acquisitions and ended up as take-over targets. 
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6. Concluding remarks  
 
Our paper sheds light on current debates about the future of ‘shareholder value 
capitalism’ and the problems firms face if they are highly dependent on capital 
markets. Comparing the acquisition strategy of four major players in the brewery 
industry, we found that stock market pressures led to more risky acquisition profiles 
by MNCs originating from liberal market economies.  
 
Moreover, our research confirms earlier research findings (Lopes, 2007; Lewis, 2001) 
that successful global players apply a risk-taking approach which carefully combines 
entrepreneurship and professional management. However, based on the findings of 
this study we  add that this is not only an indicator of the importance of family 
ownership within this sector, but also of the role of home country specific forms of 
corporate financing and effective management of resources for the acquiring firm, 
especially in both the acquisition and the post-acquisition phase.  
 
Our analysis has also shown that eclectic application of conceptual ideas can be a 
useful approach to analyse the behaviour of management in MNCs. Such an approach 
has been fruitfully applied earlier by scholars such as Dunning (1988) in the area of 
international business and Sorge (2005) in the areas of international management and 
organisation studies. In this paper, in order to analyse and compare the risk profiles 
and managerial risk-taking practices of MNCs when engaging in large acquisitions, 
we have combined theories about the role of home country institutions for the 
acquiring firm, ownership patterns and the resource based view of firms.  
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Our findings can also be related to a current debate in the British Journal of 
Management criticizing mainstream corporate governance research for pointing to a 
“universal link between corporate governance practices (e.g. shareholder activism, 
board independence) and performance outcomes, but neglects how interdependences 
between the organization and diverse environments lead to variations in the 
effectiveness of different corporate governance practices” (Filatotchev and Nakajima 
2010, p. 591). Accordingly, our paper demonstrates why and how national 
institutional diversity matters in the analysis of the management of international 
acquisitions. In our study we contribute to the growing body of literature on country-
of-origin effects. This research stream has dealt with many different aspects of 
corporate internationalization such as cross-border management styles (e.g. 
Dörrenbächer, 2000; Whitley, 2001), management and employment practices (e.g. 
Ferner, 1997; Geppert et al., 2003) or internationalization patterns (Rugman 2005), 
but has missed out on looking at acquisitions, which have been observed as the 
dominant mode of internationalization over the past two decades (UNCTAD 2010). 
 
Next to the fact that the country of origin matters to understand managerial risk-taking 
in international acquisitions, our paper proved that concentrated ownership patterns 
have reinforcing effects on managerial risk-taking in MNCs which originate from 
coordinated market economies to adopt more long-term and sustainable strategies 
when selecting and integrating newly acquired firms. Our empirical findings reveal 
significant path-dependencies related to historically grown societal institutions and 
ownership patterns, especially in the cases of Heineken and S&N. However, our 
findings also show the role of social agency. In the cases of A-B and Carlsberg, 
 29
powerful social actors-- the family in the case of A-B and powerful shareholders in 
the case of Carlsberg -- and their interests had a moderating influence on expected 
path dependencies. To better elucidate these moderating effects is an issue that goes 
beyond the scope of this study and requires more in-depth research. Finally, because 
of the strong oligopolistic structure of the global brewery industry, studying the four 
leading companies affirms the representative nature of our findings for the global 
brewery industry. Future research needs to apply our research question in other 
industries and cross-sectoral comparisons. 
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Table I:  Aggregation of Funding Types (2003-2007)v 
5 Yr Averages     
 
A-B 
(USA) S&N (UK) 
Heineken 
(NL) 
Carlsberg 
(DK) 
Loan Capital 98.61% 57.89% 34.11% 45.75% 
Bank Loans 0.60% 31.27% 42.39% 29.63% 
Finance leases 
   0.35% 
Bills and notes 0.31%    
Bank Ins and Overdrafts 
   3.16% 
Mortgages 
   5.06% 
Other Loans 0.49% 3.44% 7.75% 16.05% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Sources: Thomson Financial Extel Company reports 2008
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Table II: Large acquisitions of Heineken, Carlsberg, Anheuser Busch and Scottish & 
Newcastle compared  
 
Year  Shares 
 
-bought 
-owned 
Trans-
action (T) 
Value  
(m) 
Sales 
volume 
mhl  
No. of 
Empl- 
oyees 
T-value as 
multiple of 
Sales (1)  
T-value 
as 
Multiple 
of 
EBITDA 
(1) 
T Value 
as 
Multiple 
of hl 
(€/hl) (1) 
Heineken (NL)   
Cruzcampo (ES) 
(3)  
2000 88.2 
88.2 
650 m€  6 2200 1.81 (2) n.a.  113(2)  
BBAG /Brau 
Union (AU)  
2002 100 
100 
1899 m€ 16 7080 1.73 10.2 146 
Bravo (RUS)  2002 100 
100 
395 m€ 2.9 1600 2.43 9.7 137 
 
Carlsberg (DK)  
Okocim (PL) 1996/ 
2000 
100 
100 
n.a.  n.a. ca. 1300 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Brauerei 
Feldschloesschen 
(CH)  
2000 100 
100 
574 m€ 2,4 2600 1.60 8.6 99 
Holsten (GER)  2004  100 
100 
437 m€ n.a. 1500 0.99 9.1 71 
 
Anheuser-Busch 
(USA) 
 
Grupo Modelo SA 
de CV (MEX) (5)  
1993/
1997 
50.2 
50.2 
1600 m$ 35.4 41149 1.6 (2)  11 (2)  86.9 (2)  
Tsingtao Brewery  
Co. Ltd. (CHN)  
2002 23.6 
27 
181.6 m$ 25 n.a. 1.2 (2)  n.a.  n.a. 
Harbin Brewery 
Grp Ltd. (CHN) (4)  
2004 100  
100 
720 m$ n.a. 8000 5.0 (2)  34.2 (2)  n.a. 
 
Scottish & 
Newcastle (UK) 
 
Kronenbourg/ 
Danone Beer (F)  
2000 100 
100 
2700 m€  n.a n.a 1.8 11.3 183 
Central de Cervejas 
(P)  
2002/
2003 
100 
100 
828 m€  2.7  n.a. 3.3 11.4 251 
Hartwall Oyj (SF) / 
BBH  
2002 100 
100 
2273 m€ na. na. 2.81 10.1 142 
Sources: Thomson Financial Extel Company reports 2008, Datamonitor Company profiles 2008, various articles from the 
business press 
(1) Data taken from table 2 of Ebneth and Theuvsen 2007:382  
(2) own calculation (adjusted for % of  shares owned)  
(3) sales 1999 =407 m€ 
(4) pre tax profit 2002 = 21 mUS-$, sales 2002 = 144 mUS-$  
(5) Net profit 1997 293,5 mUS-$, Sales 1997= 1930 mUS-$ 
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Table III: Large acquisitions and risk-taking:  Heineken, Carlsberg, Anheuser Busch 
and Scottish & Newcastle compared  
 
 
Ownership  Country 
of origin 
VoC  
Size of 
the 
home 
market 
Foreig
n 
presen
ce 
before 
1990  
Assess
ment 
of risk-
taking 
Risk-taking profiles  
Heineken  
(NL) 
Family 
owned 
(majority)  
Coord. 
Market 
Economy  
Small  Con-
sider- 
able  
Low  - Rather low financial exposition 
- Well selected targets with high 
value creation potentials 
- Long term orientation 
- Strong focus on rationalization 
modernization and integration of 
acquired objects  
Carlsberg  
(DK) 
Foundation 
owned 
(majority) 
Coord. 
Market 
economy 
Small  Con-
sider- 
rable  
Low  - Rather low financial exposition 
- Well selected targets with high 
value creation potentials 
- Long term orientation 
- Strong focus on rationalization 
modernization and integration of 
acquired objects 
Anheuser- 
Busch (A-B) 
(USA) 
Dispersed 
stock marked 
ownership 
with a strong 
management 
influence of 
the founding 
family 
Liberal 
Market 
economy 
Large  Little High - Extremely high financial exposition 
- Partly uncareful selection of targets 
(Chinese investments)  
- Little emphasis on operational 
integration of acquired units  
Scottish & 
Newcastle 
(S&N) 
(UK) 
Dispersed 
stock marked 
ownership 
with a strong 
impact of 
financial 
markets 
actors 
Liberal 
Market 
economy 
Large  Little  High  - Rather high financial exposition 
- Partly uncareful selection of targets 
(acquisitions in saturated markets 
- Integration overload due to a 
simultaneous  acquisition of three 
large targets 
- Short time profit expectations and 
unclear revenues from divestures 
threaten the sustainability of the 
acquisition strategy 
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i
 Coordinated market economies score rather low on Hofstedes individualism scale (e.g. Germany: 68, 
France: 71, Denmark: 74, the Netherlands: 80) whereas liberal market economies score high here (UK: 
89, AUS 90, US 91). See http://www.geert-
hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php?culture1=34&culture2=23#compare (accessed 15.June 2011) 
ii
 In the case of Anheuser-Busch and Scottish & Newcastle we estimate that the three acquisitions 
considered cover more than 80% of the increase in multinationality (measured as increase in foreign 
sales to total sales). In the case of Heineken and Carlsberg we estimate coverage of at least 50%. 
iii
 Based on the screening of 140 major newspapers and journals worldwide, the HWWA press archive 
(based in Hamburg/Germany) contains press information on the largest multinational corporations in 
the world from the early 1980ies till 2005. 
iv
  Media reports indicate: a) that the sale of Center Parcs - the firms leisure business - led to significant 
increases of S&N’s share price of up to 7% (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 1, 2000) and b) 
that the firm needed these funds and stock market gains in order to realise ‘its future strategy as an 
international brewer’ (Financial Times, May 3, 2000). 
v
 In Table I it can be seen that Heineken and Carlsberg have a lower reliance on capital markets for 
their financing than A-B and S&N. Indeed in the case of S&N if a four year average is taken the loan 
capital raised rises to 63.11% and bank loans drop to 25.39% as during the four years from 2004-2007 
they depended more on capital financing from the markets. The greater dependence on bank loans 
reflects the long term relationships with local banks by Heineken and Carlsberg typical for coordinated 
market economies. 
 
